



The new EU member states:
trading off exchange rate stability
and price stability
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As of May 2004 the Czech Republic,
Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary,
Malta, Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia have
joined the European Union (EU). 
These new EU Member States will be mem-
bers of EMU with a so-called derogation.
After a two-year waiting period, their con-
vergence will be evaluated based on the
Maastricht Treaty convergence criteria. It is
likely that EMU will be enlarged within two
years time. The majority of the new EU
Member States - Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia,
Lithuania, Malta and Slovenia - have adop-
ted already ERM (Exchange Rate
Mechanism) II in June 2004 and will join
EMU probably after a two-year period, as
they do not have an opt-out clause. We will
mainly focus on this problem of trading off
both and the role of the European Central
Bank (ECB). 
First, we will assess the Maastricht Treaty
convergence criteria and how consistent
they are for the heterogeneous set of new
EU countries. Then, we analyse the implica-
tions for the new EU countries of entering
of the waiting room of ERM II.
Furthermore, we evaluate the potential
inflation differentials (Balassa-Samuelson
effect) between the new EU countries and
the euro area and its consequences for the
ECB's decision-making process. Finally, we
discuss the effectiveness of monetary poli-
cy in defending exchange rates during spe-
culative attacks and the ECB's commitment
to intervening within ERM II. 
The convergence criteria: is
there a trade off between
exchange rate stability and price
stability?
EU membership does not imply immediate
membership of EMU. However, the new EU
Member States have no formal derogation
from EMU membership as obtained earlier
by the UK and Denmark. In other words,
the new EU members have an obligation to
join EMU. Before they can enter EMU, the
new members have to fulfill the criteria as
stipulated in the Maastricht Treaty. 
However, whether and when the accession
countries satisfy the Maastricht criteria will
be to a significant extent at their discretion.
After all, Sweden has thus far evaded the
obligation to join EMU by not satisfying
the exchange rate criterion. (Buiter and
Grafe, 2002).  >|
The purpose of this Briefing Paper (*1) is to discuss the implications of the
upcoming enlargement of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) in
Europe.(*2) The current euro area countries will be joined soon by a number of
new EMU entrants that have a substantially lower income per capita. 
*1 Briefing Paper for the Monetary Dialogue of
September 2005 by the Committee on Economic and
Monetary Affairs of the European Parliament with the
President of the European Central Bank
*2 An earlier version of this Briefing Paper was
published in: C. Detken, V.Gaspar and G. Noblet
(2005), The New EU Member States: Convergence and
Stability, Third ECB Central Banking Conference, 21-
22 October 2004, Frankfurt-am-Main, April.
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The Maastricht Treaty contains four conver-
gence criteria:
1.price stability: an average inflation rate
(measured on the basis of the consumer
price index) that does not exceed by
more than 1.5 percentage-points that of,
at most, the three best performing mem-
ber countries.
2.sustainable fiscal position, meaning that
there is no excessive deficit. An excessive
deficit exists if:
• the budget deficit is higher than 3 per
cent of GDP, unless, either the ratio has
declined substantially and continuously
and has reached a level that comes close
to 3 per cent, or the excess over the 3
per cent reference value is only exceptio-
nal and temporary and the deficit
remains close to 3 per cent;
• the ratio of gross government debt to GDP
exceeds 60 per cent, unless the ratio is
sufficiently diminishing and approaching
the reference value at a satisfactory pace.
3.exchange rate stability, meaning that the
currency has respected the 'normal' fluc-
tuation margins of the Exchange Rate
Mechanism (ERM), without severe ten-
sions for at least two years (especially no
devaluation on the initiative of the mem-
ber country concerned).
4.low interest rate, meaning that the avera-
ge long-term interest rate should not
exceed by more than 2 percentage-
points the interest rates in, at most, the
three best performing countries in terms
of price stability.
Although these criteria have been criticized
for their lack of theoretical foundation (see
e.g. Eijffinger and De Haan, 2000), the old
EU countries have made it very clear that
the new EU countries have to stick to this
part of what is called the 'acquis cummu-
nautaire'. In this paper we will focus prima-
rily on the convergence criteria of price sta-
bility (1) and exchange rate stability (3)
and whether or not they are compatible
with each other.
Many studies have addressed the question
of the proper exchange rate regime for the
new Member States in the period between
entering the EU and becoming a (full)
member of the EMU. The exchange rate
regime is a key determinant of a country's
macroeconomic stability, which affects the
investment climate. Apart from the per-
spective of future EMU membership, the
choice of exchange rate regime is therefore
of great relevance for the accession coun-
tries. Table 1 shows the exchange rate regi-





It is likely that EMU will be enlarged
within two years time. Some of the new EU
Member States - e.g. Estonia, Lithuania and
Slovenia - have adopted already ERM
(Exchange Rate Mechanism) II and will
join EMU probably after a two-year period,
as they do not have an opt-out clause.
Having entered EU recently, the new
Member States face a difficult decision. 
It seems likely that the divergence of
inflation will be further increased in a
larger monetary union. Although
estimates of the so-called Balassa-
Samuelson effect differ substantially, 
it seems likely that the new EU Member
States will have higher inflation levels
than the current countries in the euro area. 
The new EU countries will have to trade off
exchange rate stability and price stability
depending on their inflation differentials
with the current euro area countries. 
This implies that the Maastricht Treaty
convergence criteria for price stability and
exchange rate stability are in their present
form incompatible. This may lead to
speculative attacks against some
currencies of the new EU countries. 
The ECB should clarify how strong its
commitment will be to intervening within
ERM II to reduce the probability of these
speculative attacks and how it will
interpret the convergence criteria of price
stability and exchange rate stability in
formulating its advice to the European
Council on euro adoption by the new EU
countries. 
Finally, the rule of law is quite essential for
strengthening the actual independence of
national central banks in the new Member
States. Central bankers in these countries
have to learn to behave independently and
politicians have to learn to accept this
independent behaviour of central bankers. 
This learning process will take time,
perhaps a generation, and should be fully
supported by the ECB. Source: Adapted from De Haan, Eijffinger and Waller (2005).
TABLE 1. EXCHANGE RATE REGIMES OF (POTENTIAL) NEW EU MEMBER STATES
Country: Exchange rate regime:
Bulgaria Fixed peg to euro (currency board)
Cyprus Exchange Rate Mechanism II
Czech Rep. Managed float to euro (inflation targeting)
Estonia Exchange Rate Mechanism II
Hungary  Crawling peg to euro with band +/- 15% (implicit inflation targeting)
Latvia Exchange Rate Mechanism II
Lithuania Exchange Rate Mechanism II
Malta Exchange Rate Mechanism II
Poland Full float (inflation targeting)
Romania Managed float (monetary aggregates targeting)
Slovakia Managed float (monetary aggregates targeting)




opted for a currency board and Romania 
for monetary aggregates targeting. 
The Baltic states have waived the scope for
fluctuation of their currencies within ERM II
on their own initiative by retaining their
previously existing currency board arrange-
ments. 
These voluntary and unilateral commit-
ments, however, do not place any additio-
nal obligations on the ECB. By contrast,
Slovenia had previously allowed the
exchange rate of its currency to fluctuate
within a specific band around a deprecia-
tion path as part of a crawling peg system.
2 
A currency board can be considered as the
most credible form of a fixed exchange rate
regime as the own currency is convertible
against a fixed exchange rate with some
other currency(ies), which is codified, be it
in a law or otherwise. The anchor currency
is generally chosen for its expected stability
and international acceptability. There is, as
a rule, no independent monetary policy as
the monetary base is backed by foreign
reserves. 
A currency board is a strong,
'doublebarrelled' commitment device
(Buiter and Grafe, 2002). Through the
currency peg it represents a commitment to
price stability. Through the 'no domestic
credit expansion' constraint, it represents a
commitment to budgetary restraint. The
value of these commitments depends either
on the currency board arrangement being
An important (political) issue that will influ-
ence the timing of EMU membership is the
interpretation of the exchange rate criterion
as provided for in the Maastricht Treaty. 
A strict interpretation is that the new EU
Member Sates should be a formal member
of ERM II for two or more years following
EU accession.
1
However, Buiter and Grafe (2002) argue
that the exchange rate criterion can be
satisfied without the candidate country
being an ERM II member. Italy and Finland
(and later Greece) joined EMU right from
the start, even though they had not spent
two years in the ERM when they were
admitted. More substantive, is the question
of the proper exchange rate regime from an
economic perspective. An important consi-
deration in choosing an exchange rate regi-
me is that the accession countries have to
liberalize international capital flows as part
of the 'acquis communautaire', making
them more vulnerable to speculative
attacks. 
As follows from Table 1, the relatively smal-
ler, new EU Member States - like Cyprus,
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta and
Slovenia - have adopted ERM II and the
relatively larger ones - the Czech Republic,
Hungary, Poland and Slovakia - have cho-
sen for (implicit) inflation targeting or
monetary aggregates targeting. From the
candidate EU-countries e.g. Bulgaria has
perceived as credible and permanent, or on
the belief that, if it is abandoned, it will be
replaced by something representing a
comparable commitment to price stability
and budgetary responsibility as a credible
currency board, like the EMU.
At the other extreme, a country may choo-
se a floating exchange rate regime with an
independent central bank with some kind
of an inflation targeting strategy. Berger,
De Haan and Eijffinger (2001) show that a
currency board becomes, ceteris paribus,
more attractive under the following condi-
tions:
• the imported foreign monetary policy is
in the hands of an independent and 
conservative (i.e. inflation-averse) foreign
central bank. 
• the home country's central bank is 
relatively dependent and output-oriented
compared to the foreign central bank.
• the correlation between the home and
foreign country's output shocks is high.
Compared to a full-fledged central bank, a
currency board is a cheap way of managing
monetary policy. As pointed out by Buiter
and Grafe (2002), all that is needed is a
sufficient number of modestly skilled bank
clerks who exchange, at a fixed rate,
domestic currency for the foreign currency
in terms of which the peg is defined. As a
currency board implies that the central
bank cannot (fully) act as lender of last
resort, no country should consider a cur-
rency board unless it can afford to do wit-
hout a lender of last resort. As this safety
net for the financial sector is missing, a
prerequisite for a currency board is a reaso-
nably healthy financial system. Likewise, no
country should consider a currency board
unless it has a sound fiscal framework that
will not require discretionary access to cen-
tral bank financing by the general govern-
ment. 
A currency board runs the risk of a real
misalignment. If a country's inflation
remains higher than that of the pegging
country, the currency can become overvalu-
ed (Pautola and Backé, 1998). While fixing >
1At its meeting in Amsterdam in June 1997, the European Council decided to replace the 'old' Exchange Rate
Mechanism of the EMS (ERM I) by the 'new' Exchange Rate Mechanism Mark II (ERM II). The ERM II offers the
opportunity to stabilize exchange rates of EU members, which participate in EMU (the 'ins') and of those, which
do not (the 'outs'). According to the Maastricht Treaty, each member state that is not yet allowed to participate
in the euro area shall treat its exchange rate policy as 'a matter of common interest'. In principle, this should
also apply to the countries with an opting-out clause, i.e. Denmark and the UK. Nonetheless, membership of
ERM II is voluntary for all 'outs'. The operating procedures for ERM II have been laid down in an agreement
between the ECB and the national central banks in the non-euro area. ERM II is designed as an asymmetrical,
euro-centered exchange rate system. The main feature of ERM II is the wide fluctuation of + 15 per cent between
the euro and the currency of the country participating in the mechanism.
2From the launch of the euro at the beginning of 1999 up to Slovenia's entry into ERM II, its currency lost totally
21 % of its value against the euro. The success of Slovenia's ERM II membership will depend on whether the




the exchange rate is a fast way to disinflate
an economy starting with a higher inflation
rate, pegging the exchange rate will not
necessarily reduce the inflation rate instan-
taneously to that of the pegging country. 
There are several reasons why inflation will
not fall right away (Roubini, 1999). 
First, purchasing power parity does not
hold exactly in the short run since domestic
and foreign goods are not perfectly substi-
tutable and the mix of goods and services
in the countries concerned may differ.
Second, non-tradable goods prices do not
feel the same competitive pressures as tra-
dable goods prices, thus inflation in the
non-traded sector may fall only slowly.
Third, as there is significant inertia in nomi-
nal wage growth, wage inflation might not
fall right away. Often wage contracts are
backward looking and the adjustment of
wages will occur slowly. 
Finally, differing productivity growth rates
may be reflected in differences in price
increases (Balassa-Samuelson effect). If
domestic inflation does not converge to the
level of the pegging country, a real appreci-
ation will occur over time. 
As Roubini (1999) points out, such a real
exchange rate appreciation may cause a
loss of competitiveness and a structural
worsening of the trade balance, which
makes the current account deficit less
sustainable.
It follows from the preceding analysis that a
currency board with a peg to the euro may
be the proper exchange rate regime for
accession countries on their road to full
EMU membership. Apart from the (related)
risk of misalignment, there may, however,
be a serious problem. Together, the exchan-
ge rate and the inflation criterion restrict
the scope for changes in the real exchange
rate of the accession countries vis-à-vis the
euro. 
Due to the Balassa-Samuelson effect, the
accession countries may experience higher
inflation than the euro area in case of a
nominal fixed exchange rate. This even
leads Szapary (2000) to argue that the
inflation criterion of the Maastricht Treaty
should be relaxed or reinterpreted. To exa-
mine whether this conclusion is justified,
we will now first discuss the literature on
the Balassa-Samuelson effect in the transi-
tion countries.
The implications of EMU
enlargement: how large will the
inflation differentials be?
It is often argued that due to the Balassa-
Samuelson effect, transition countries have
experienced a real appreciation of their real
exchange rates. As a consequence of econ-
omic restructuring, many transition coun-
tries have experienced rapid productivity
growth in their industrial sectors. As pro-
ductivity growth in the traded goods sector
exceeds that in the non-traded goods sec-
tor, non-traded goods prices increase due
to the wage equalization process between
both sectors. 
When productivity growth in the transition
countries exceeds productivity growth in
the countries in the euro area, the transi-
tion countries will have a higher inflation
rate. According to Eurostat (2001), average
productivity in manufacturing in transition
countries was only about 40 percent of the
EU average in 1998. 
Therefore, we can expect further high pro-
ductivity growth. This restructuring will,
however, take some time. During this peri-
od, these countries will probably experience
higher inflation than the current EMU
countries. 
This raises two questions. First, how big are
these inflation differentials between current
and potential future EMU members?
Second, what are the policy implications?
3
There is clearly no consensus in the litera-
ture on the magnitude of the Balassa-
Samuelson effect in the transition coun-
tries. Table 2 provides a summary of various
recent studies. Estimates vary widely. 
Whereas Rogers (2001), for instance, esti-
mates that the Balassa-Samuelson effect is
likely to imply two additional percentage
points of annual inflation in the accession
economies, Égert (2002a,b) finds little evi-
dence of a higher inflation rate due to the
Balassa-Samuelson effect in the Czech
Republic and Slovakia. The extremely high
inflation differentials implied by sectoral
productivity developments and labor shares
for Hungary and Poland as reported by
Backé, Fidrmuc, Reiniger and Schardax
(2002) attract attention. According to these
authors, their figures reflect mainly the
massive gains in productivity in the trada-
ble-goods sector that have been achieved
during the 1990s in these two countries. 
They argue, however, that past figures are
probably not a good guide for the future as
convergence implies that productivity incre-
ases will tend to decelerate as higher pro-
ductivity levels are reached. 
These diverging outcomes are partly the
result of differences in method. An impor-
tant factor is that not all studies summari-
zed in Table 2 are restricted to estimates of
the Balassa-Samuelson effect. The literature
has pointed out various other channels
than can give rise to inflation differentials.
Some of the studies take these into
account. 
For instance, Halpern and Wyplosz (2001)
have estimated the Balassa-Samuelson
effect for a panel of nine transition coun-
tries also including demand factors. The
same is true for Coricelli and Jazbec (2001),
who, in addition, add a variable capturing
banking l
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3Apart from the impact of the Balassa-Samuelson
effect on inflation differentials, there are other reasons
why enlargement may lead to more asymmetries in the
monetary union. First, business cycles in the accession
countries may be out of line with the rest of the euro
area. Furthermore, asymmetry in monetary
transmission in comparison to the rest of the euro area
may also make ECB policies more difficult. See for a




Next, they regress the relative consumer
price levels of 29 OECD countries on the
GDP-based comparative price levels of
these countries (i.e. on ratios of the GDP
measured in PPP and at current exchange
rates). The coefficients of the independent
variables in both equations are negative
and highly significant. In a third step,
Pelkmans et al. (2000) calculate the relative
consumer price levels of the ten Central
and Eastern European accession countries,
based on their comparative price levels and
the coefficient estimated for the OECD
structural misalignments. Pelkmans, Gros
and Nunez Ferrer (2000) have followed a
very different estimation procedure. 
These authors have based their estimation
on relative price levels in accession coun-
tries compared to existing EMU member
countries rather than on productivity
growth differentials. The authors proceed in
four steps. First, they regress the deviation
of inflation rates of euro area countries
form the euro area average on the relative
consumer price levels of these countries.
countries in the second equation. Finally,
the authors use the coefficient estimated in
the first equation for the euro area coun-
tries to compute the accession countries'
inflation differentials form the average euro
area, which are implied by their relative
consumer price levels. Their results show on
average an inflation differential of 3.8 per-
centage points between the accession
countries and the euro area average due to
estimated differences in the price levels. 
As to the policy implications, the evidence
reviewed suggests that accession countries
banking l
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TABLE 2. ESTIMATES OF THE INFLATION DIFFERENTIALS (%) IN THE NEW EU COUNTRIES
Study: Countries: Vis-à-vis Size:
Jakab and Kovacs (1999) Hungary 29 OECD countries 1.9
Pelkmans et al. (2000) CEE 10 3.8
Rother (2000) Slovenia 2.6  during 1993-98





Halpern and Wyplosz (2001) Panel of 9 transition  Based on model for 2.9-3.1 for the period 1991-99
countries (incl. Russia) service-to-consumer 
goods price ratio
Corizelli and Jazbec (2001) Panel of 19  Based on model for relative 1 in the medium term (1990-98)
transition countries price of tradable goods 
De Broeck and Sløk (2001) Panel of transition countries On average 1.5 
Égert (2002a) Czech Rep. Germany 0.648      0.303 for 1991-2000
Hungary 2.589      1.295 for 1991-2000
Poland 3.245      1.901 for 1991-2000
Slovakia -0.154    -0.075 for 1993-2000
Slovenia 1.321      0.661 for 1993-2000 a)
Égert (2002b) Panel of Czech Rep., Hungary, Germany With share of non-tradables as in GDP it
Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia ranges from 0.094 to 1.903 depending on 
time period and data. Estimates for 
1996-2001 period range from 1.707 
to 1.903. With share of non-tradables as in 
CPI the latter range from 0.810 to 1.059.
Backé et al. (2002) Czech Rep. Main trading partners 
b) 0.35  1995-2000
Hungary 3.84  1995-2000
Poland 9.76  1995-2000
Slovenia 3.88  1995-2000
a) First column shows results using GDP deflator, second column shows results with CPI. b) Under the assumption that there are no productivity-inflation diffe-
rentials between tradable and non-tradable goods in the main trading partners, which seems unrealistic.73
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with a fixed exchange rate regime may have
problems in meeting the inflation criterion
of the Maastricht Treaty. Countries with a
somewhat more flexible exchange rate 
regime are unlikely to have problems to
meet the Maastricht criteria for Balassa-
Samuelson reasons. The Balassa-Samuelson
effect is unlikely to exhaust the 15 per cent
bands of the ERM II in two years. Some
observers have argued that the convergen-
ce criteria should be modified (see e.g.
Coricelli and Jazbec, 2001). One could, for
instance, compare the inflation rates of the
accession countries with those in the least
developed EMU countries or allow for a
higher than the 1.5 percentage-point diffe-
rential. These suggestions have met little
support from the current EMU countries.
Admitting countries with relatively higher
inflation rates could increase the HICP
inflation in the euro area. However, this
argument should not be overstressed as the
weight of inflation in the accession coun-
tries in the total euro area inflation rate is
quite low. For instance, a 3 per cent diffe-
rence in inflation rates between the 1998
Accession group and the rest of the euro
area would only imply a 0.1% increase in
the euro area's GDP-weighted inflation
(Égert, 2002a).
Buiter (2004) warned very recently that
forcing the new EU Member States to enter
the ERM II waiting room for the euro is
even "pointless and potentially dangerous".
He thinks that creative reinterpretation is
essential, if unnecessary risk to the financi-
al stability of the EMU candidates is to be
avoided. According to Buiter no monetary
authority should be asked to pursue more
than one nominal target. 
The simultaneous pursuit of three nominal
targets (nominal exchange rate, inflation
target and nominal interest rate target)
greatly enhances the likelihood that a
"major financial accident" will happen. He
stated that EMU candidates should be allo-
wed to have a free floating exchange rate
between the time their date and rate for
joining the euro are announced and the
time their currency is locked into the euro.
Buiter urged euro membership as soon as
possible in the national interest of the new
EU countries, noting that even the biggest
country - i.e. Poland - is too small, too
open and too financially vulnerable to run
its own currency. Therefore, he concludes
that without new rules for euro members-
hip there are risks that the accession of a
country being not ready for the euro could
result in harm to other old and new EMU
members. 
Equally important is that the increase in the
dispersion of inflation rates in the euro area
may increase the risks implied by the
decentralized set-up of the ECB. As the
catch-up process of the new EU countries
will continue after they have joined EMU,
the enlargement of the monetary union
implies more inflation divergence. 
If national considerations play a role in the
behavior of national central bank governors
in the Governing Council of the ECB, it may
become more likely that the focus on euro-
area-wide developments will be undermin-
ed. From this perspective, the future enlar-
gement of EMU only underscores the need
for reform of the ECB in the sense of
strengthening the Executive Board at
Frankfurt-am-Main vis-à-vis the presidents
and governors of the National Central
Banks (NCBs) within the Governing Council
(see Eijffinger, 2003).
The effectiveness of monetary
policy in defending exchange
rates during speculative attacks:
theory and evidence  
The theoretical literature on the effective-
ness of monetary policy in supporting a
currency during episodes of severe specula-
tive pressure can be distinguished into 
two groups, the  'traditional' view and the 
'revisionist' view. The traditional view
argues that the monetary authority can
support the exchange rate by raising inte-
rest rates. Higher interest rates discourage
capital outflows and appreciate the exchan-
ge rate. The revisionist view argues that
when speculative attacks are accompanied
by balance-sheet problems in the financial
and corporate sectors, monetary tightening
may have a depreciating effect on the
exchange rate.   
We start with summarizing the traditional
view on the effectiveness of monetary poli-
cy in case of speculative attacks. Furman
and Stiglitz (1998) raise two important
concerns regarding the traditional effect of
monetary policy. As the interest rate increa-
se is likely to be temporary, the support of
the exchange rate is also temporary. 
Moreover, a 1% expected nominal depreca-
tion the following day would require accor-
ding to Furman and Stiglitz no less than a
3678% annualized interest rate increase. In
response to these doubts, the proponents
of the traditional view argue that increases
in interest rates might be able to streng-
then the exchange rate permanently,
through their effect on the expected future
exchange rate. Three possible channels of
this effect can be distinguished. First, the
Dornbusch (1976) 'overshooting' model of
the exchange rate argues that an interest
rate increase will lower inflation and will
lead to a stronger expected future nominal
exchange rate. 
4Second, Backus and Driffill
(1985) and Drazen (2000 and 2003)
explain how raising the interest rate could
signal the willingness or ability of the
monetary authorities to defend the exchan-
ge rate. When the interest rate returns to
its initial level, the change in expectations
persists, causing a permanently stronger
exchange rate.  Finally, Furman and Stiglitz
(1998) mention that a temporary interest
rate defense provides policymakers with
time to implement reforms that strengthen
the exchange rate permanently.
banking l
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4Under that assumption of purchasing power parity
(PPP) applies in the long run.
5 According to Drazen, the opposite could also hold
where raising interest rates signals the lack of other
means to defend the exchange rate, for example
because of a low level of reserves.B&F
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likely that the post-crisis real appreciation
would take place through nominal appreci-
ation rather than through higher inflation.
Looking at crises episodes in 80 countries,
they find that monetary tightening appreci-
ates the nominal exchange rate, but only in
countries with strong banking sectors. 
Kraay (2003) identifies episodes of severe
speculative pressure preceded by relatively
fixed exchange rates in 54 developed and
developing countries. He asks whether 
high interest rates defend currencies during 
speculative attacks. Using monthly data,
Kraay finds no impact of interest rates on
the outcome of speculative attacks. 
The empirical assessment of monetary 
policy effectiveness is likely to suffer from
endogeneity. Regressing the exchange rate,
as a dependent variable, on the interest
rate, as an independent variable, might
cause problems, as the interest rate (mone-
tary policy stance) is likely to depend on
third factors, some of which also affect 
the exchange rate. Kraay (2003) instru-
ments for monetary policy but still finds 
no significant impact of monetary policy 
on the exchange rate. So, the empirical 
evidence of both time-series and cross-
section approaches to the effectiveness of
monetary policy in defending exchanges
rates during speculative attacks is mixed
and non-conclusive. 
The operating procedures for
ERM II: should the ECB and the
non-euro area NCBs intervene
intramarginally?
The operating procedures for ERM II, which
have been laid down in an agreement bet-
ween the ECB and the non-euro area NCBs,
are quite crucial for defending the curren-
cies participating in ERM II against specula-
tive attacks. For each of these currencies a
central rate vis-à-vis the euro and a stan-
dard fluctuation band of + 15 % are defin-
ed, in principle supported by automatic
unlimited intervention at the margins, with
very short-term financing available. 
The revisionist view, however, argues that
tighter monetary policy affects the probabi-
lity of bankruptcy and uncertainty about
the future. Firms and banks will face higher
costs of borrowing, which will decrease
investments and profits. If they are negati-
vely exposed to higher interest rates, their
net worth will drop as well. 
Consequently, the probability of default in
the corporate and banking sector goes up
and this adverse effect may more than off-
set the traditional effects and cause the
nominal exchange rate to depreciate inste-
ad of appreciate.
Empirical evidence on the effectiveness of
monetary policy is mixed. Two approaches
can be distinguished. 
The first approach assesses the time-series
relationship between interest rates and
exchange rates in one or more countries.
Goldfajn and Baig (2002), using daily data,
find little impact of interest rates on
exchange rates or vice versa in the
1997/1998 Asian crisis countries. 
Dekle, Hsiao, and Wang (2002), based on
weekly data, show a small supportive effect
of interest rates on nominal exchange rates
during the crises in Korea, Malaysia, and
Thailand. Gould and Kamin (2001) also use
weekly data and find that monetary policy
did not significantly affect exchange rates
in Thailand, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia,
Philippines, and Mexico.
The second approach looks at a large cross-
section of currency crises or speculative
attack episodes and determines whether
raising interest rates had a supportive
effect on the exchange rates in those peri-
ods. Furman and Stiglitz (1998) look at
nine developing countries in the nineties
and assess whether episodes of sustained
high interest rates were followed by an
appreciation of the domestic currency. 
Using daily data, they find a significant
depreciating impact of interest rates on
exchange rates in low-inflation countries.
Goldfajn and Gupta (1999) ask whether a
tightening of monetary policy made it more
However, the ECB and the participating
NCBs could suspend automatic interven-
tion, if this were to conflict with their pri-
mary objective of maintaining price stabili-
ty. Exchange rate policy cooperation may
be further strengthened, for example by
allowing closer exchange rate links between
the euro and the other currencies in ERM II
where, and to the extent that, these are
appropiate in the light of progress towards
convergence (European Central Bank,
2004). So, it is up to the ECB to decide
whether it has a hard or soft commitment
to exchange rate intervention within the
fluctuation band of + 15 % and on the
basis of which conditions with respect to
the country's fiscal and monetary policy. 
These intramarginal interventions will play,
just like they did during ERM I, a crucial
role in deterring speculative attacks against
the ERM II currencies. A soft commitment
of the ECB to intramarginal intervention
may provoke speculative attacks in case the
financial markets have serious doubts
regarding the real and nominal convergence
process of the country involved. On the
contrary, a hard commitment to intervening
within ERM II from the part of the ECB is
only realistic when it is combined with con-
ditionality in terms of fiscal and monetary
policy. The question is, of course, whether
or not (constructive or creative) ambiguity
in intervention policy will be beneficial to
the exchange rate stability of the ERM II
currencies. I think that ambiguity - creative
or not - will not be beneficial for exchange
rate stability. Therefore, it is essential that
the ECB will clarify how strong its commit-
ment will be to intervening within ERM II to
reduce the probability of these speculative
attacks and how it will interpret the conver-
gence criteria of price stability and exchan-
ge rate stability in formulating its advice to
the European Council on euro adoption by






The importance of central bank
independence in the new EU
Member States: does legal
independence of non-euro area
NCBs also imply actual
independence?
Finally, the role of central bank indepen-
dence in the new EU Member States should
not be underestimated. The fifth implicit
convergence criterion is the independence
of the NCBs of these countries. They have
to comply with the legal independence of
their central banks in order to make the
position of the central bank in accordance
with the Maastricht Treaty and the Statute
of the European (System of) Central
Bank(s). What matters is, however, the
actual independence of the central bank. 
Only the actual practice of central bank
independence determines the effectiveness
of monetary policy to assure price stability.
Legal independence is a necessary but not
sufficient condition for a truly independent
central bank and can be seen as a funda-
mental basis for building the institutional
climate needed for actual independence. 
The translation from legal independence
into actual independence is primarily
determined by the compliance with the law
or the rule of law in a country. Eijffinger
and Stadhouders (2003) have investigated
empirically the impact of the rule of law on
the rate of inflation. Several Institutional
Quality Indicators (IQIs) are integrated in
their empirical test between the rate of
inflation and legal central bank indepen-
dence. 
When a country has developed a credible
institutional framework, the rule of law is
expected to be relatively larger than in
countries with an inadequate legal, political
and regulatory framework. IQIs are used as
a proxy for the rule of law to test empirical-
ly the potential interaction between legal
central bank independence, the rule of law
and inflation.
These IQIs (Repudiation of Contracts by
Government, Rule of Law and Bureaucratic
Quality) measure some aspects of the cre-
dibility of the government to protect pro-
perty rights and the enforcement of
contracts. Eijffinger and Stadhouders find
that the rule of law matters for the relation
between legal central bank independence
and the rate of inflation in a country. The
individual IQIs are each significantly and
negatively related to the rate of inflation
for 44 developed and developing countries
during the period 1980-1989. This result
becomes stronger when two or three insti-
tutional quality indicators are combined. 
Although the IQIs are highly correlated to
each other, a combination of IQIs may give
a more complete picture of the qualitative
institutional environment in a country. 
Therefore, the rule of law is quite essential
for strengthening the actual independence
of NCBs in the new Member States. Central
bankers in these countries have to learn to
behave independently and politicians have
to learn to accept this independent behavi-
our of central bankers. This learning process
will take time, perhaps a generation, and
should be fully supported by the ECB. 
Conclusions
It is likely that EMU will be enlarged in two
years time. Some of the new EU Member
States - e.g. Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia,
Lithuania, Malta and Slovenia - will join
EMU probably after a two-year period, as
they do not have an opt-out clause. The
new EU countries face a difficult decision in
trading off exchange rate stability and price
stability depending on their inflation diffe-
rentials with the current euro area coun-
tries. This implies that the Maastricht Treaty
convergence criteria for price stability and
exchange rate stability are in their present
form incompatible. This may lead to specu-
lative attacks against some currencies of
the new EU countries. The empirical evi-
dence of both time-series and cross-section
approaches to the effectiveness of moneta-
ry policy in defending exchanges rates
during speculative attacks is mixed and
non-conclusive. So, it is up to the ECB to
decide whether it has a hard or soft com-
mitment to exchange rate intervention
within the fluctuation band of + 15 % and
on the basis of which conditions with res-
pect to the country's fiscal and monetary
policy. A soft commitment of the ECB to
intramarginal intervention may provoke
speculative attacks in case the financial
markets have serious doubts regarding the
real and nominal convergence process of
the country involved. On the contrary, a
hard commitment to intervening within
ERM II from the part of the ECB is only
realistic when it is combined with conditio-
nality in terms of fiscal and monetary poli-
cy. Ambiguity in intervention policy will not
be beneficial to the exchange rate stability
of the ERM II currencies. The ECB should
clarify its commitment to intervening within
ERM II to reduce these speculative attacks
and its interpretation of the convergence
criteria in formulating its advice to the
European Council on euro adoption.
Finally, the rule of law is quite essential 
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6Vice-President Papademos (2004) of the ECB advises
the new EU Member States to focus monetary policy
on price stability as the primary objective, both before
and after ERM II entry. Participation in ERM 
II can play a very useful role in fostering policy discipline and consistency, but also in assessing the
appropriateness of the "central parity" of a currency's exchange rate against the euro. According to Papademos
this is essential for deciding on that currency's permanent conversion rate to the euro. Policy consistency over
time and across policy areas is paramount for sustainable convergence. It will help to stabilize expectations,
avoid shifts in market perceptions and improve credibility facilitating disinflation and progress towards real
convergence. Nominal and real convergence are interdependent, can be mutually reinforcing, and should
therefore be pursued in parallel.B&F
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for strengthening the actual independence
of NCBs in the new Member States.
Central bankers in these countries have to
learn to behave independently and politi-
cians have to learn to accept this indepen-
dent behaviour of central bankers. This
learning process will take time, perhaps a
generation, and should be fully supported
by the ECB.
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